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The specter of a “liquidity trap,” originally
proposed as a theoretical possibility by John
Maynard Keynes (1936) but long considered to
be of doubtful practical relevance, has recently
created alarm among the world’s central banks.
In Japan, the overnight rate has been essentially
at zero for most of the time since February
1999, making further interest-rate cuts impossi-
ble. Yet until well into 2003, growth remained
anemic while prices continued to fall, suggest-
ing a need for further monetary stimulus. Since
March 2001, the Bank of Japan has supple-
mented its “zero-interest-rate policy” with a
policy of “quantitative easing,” under which
additional bank reserves are supplied beyond
those needed to keep overnight interest rates at
zero. Yet an increase in base money of more
than 50 percent failed to halt the deflation, sug-
gesting a liquidity trap. More recently, other
central banks, including the Fed, have come
close enough to the zero bound to worry about
how they would deal with a similar predicament.
Here we first discuss whether monetary pol-
icy should actually become ineffective when the
zero bound on interest rates is reached. We
argue that open-market operations, even of “un-
conventional” types, will be ineffective if they
do not change expectations about the future
conduct of policy; in this sense, a liquidity trap
is possible. Nonetheless, a credible commitment
regarding future policy can largely mitigate the
distortions created by the zero bound. We fully
characterize the optimal commitment in a sim-
ple example.
I. Ineffectiveness of Open-Market Operations
In a recent paper (Eggertsson and Woodford,
2003), we analyze the effects of open-market
operations once the zero bound has been
reached, in a representative-household opti-
mizing model of the monetary transmission
mechanism with monopolistic competition and
staggered price-setting. We assume preferences
that allow for satiation in money balances at a
finite level, so that it is possible to drive short-
term nominal interest rates to zero, as the Bank
of Japan has done. In this case, the standard
money-market equilibrium condition must be
replaced by a pair of inequalities,
(1) M/P  LY, i i  0
together with the requirement that at least one of
the conditions holds with equality at any time.
(Here M is base money, P the price level, Y
aggregate output, and i the short-term nominal
interest rate.) Conditions (1) imply that any
monetary base above a certain minimum will be
equally consistent with a zero-interest-rate pol-
icy; this makes it possible to pursue “quantita-
tive easing” as a separate instrument of policy.
To examine the effects of such a policy, we
let an operating target i* be specified for the
interest rate, as a function of the evolution of
prices and output. The associated base supply
rule is then assumed to be of the form
(2) M  PLY, i*P, Y, ...
where the function  is never less than 1, and
greater than 1 only if the interest-rate target i*
equals 0. Rule (2) implies that i* is the unique
solution to (1); but the form of  when i* is zero
can nonetheless be specified independently of
the rule that determines i*. We also allow for a
very general specification of the assets that the
central bank acquires when it expands the base;
these may be different when i* is zero than
under normal circumstances, or when prices fall
too far. Finally, we specify fiscal policy in a
way that implies that open-market operations
will not change the path of total government
liabilities, except insofar as real activity, prices,
interest rates, or asset prices change.
We then establish that the conditions that
determine the rational-expectations equilibrium
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paths of Y, P, i, and asset prices are completely
unaffected by changes in the function , or in
the composition of the central bank’s balance
sheet. Hence, “quantitative easing” that implies
no change in interest-rate policy should neither
stimulate real activity nor halt deflation; and this
is equally true regardless of the kind of assets
purchased by the central bank.
Alan J. Auerbach and Maurice Obstfeld
(2003) obtain an apparently different result in a
similar model because they assume that an
open-market operation permanently increases
the monetary base. This means that the base is
also increased at future dates at which the zero
bound is not expected to bind, at which times
the higher base implies that future interest-rate
policy will be different; our irrelevance propo-
sition shows that it is the commitment to expan-
sionary policy in the future that is effective, and
not the “quantitative easing” while overnight
rates are at zero.
Might one nonetheless argue that it is reason-
able for people always to expect such an in-
crease in base money to be permanent? We give
two examples of hypotheses about the central
bank under which the “quantitative easing”
would not imply any change in the future mon-
etary base: if the central bank is expected to
follow a Taylor rule once it exits from the trap,
or if it is expected to pursue an inflation target.
And in fact, there seems to be a common ex-
pectation that the recent massive increase in the
Japanese monetary base will not be permanent.
Have we neglected fiscal effects of open-
market operations? Auerbach and Obstfeld
stress the additional benefit of being able to
lower the tax burden, as a result of substituting
money for interest-earning Treasury debt. This
is indeed a further channel through which a
permanent increase in the monetary base would
be stimulative, but it does not provide any rea-
son for “quantitative easing” while interest rates
are zero to be beneficial. The flow government
budget constraint can be written as





where Lt is the beginning-of-period nominal
value of total government liabilities, t is real
tax collections, gt is government purchases, and
Qt,t1 is the stochastic discount factor. If Mt is
changed only in periods when it is zero, there is
no change in the paths for taxes that are con-
sistent with intertemporal solvency, even if the
central bank acquires Treasury securities with a
positive interest yield. Hence, our irrelevance
proposition continues to apply, even when one
takes account of tax distortions.
It may surprise some that we obtain the same
result regardless of the type of assets purchased
by the central bank. Should not purchases of
assets with different risk characteristics than
base money cause a “portfolio effect”? In
representative-household asset-pricing theory,
the answer is no. The value of an asset depends
on the representative household’s marginal util-
ity of income in the states in which it pays off,
and that depends on the economy’s total supply
of goods in those states, not on the quantity of
assets that private households must hold. Of
course, the representative-household model is
an idealization, but it suggests that such effects
may well be tiny in reality.
II. Signaling Future Monetary Policy
Our neutrality result, however, does not im-
ply that there is nothing a central bank can do in
a situation like Japan’s. Expectations regarding
the future conduct of monetary policy do make
a great difference, and actions taken to change
those expectations can affect the economy even
without any change in the current level of over-
night rates.
Expectations matter through several chan-
nels. First, as emphasized by Paul Krugman
(1998), an increase in expected inflation can
lower the real rate of interest associated with the
current zero nominal rate. But other channels
are important as well in a full intertemporal
analysis. A commitment to keep rates low for a
longer period of time can stimulate current
spending, by affecting the determinants of longer-
term interest rates and the exchange rate. And
finally, the expectation that a boom will be
created later should stimulate spending now,
through permanent-income and accelerator
mechanisms.
What kind of commitment regarding future
policy is desirable? We compute the optimal
policy for a simple numerical example. An ex-
ogenous real disturbance is assumed to lower
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the natural rate of interest from its normal level
(4 percent per annum) to 2 percent for a
random number of quarters, after which it re-
turns permanently to the normal level. It is not
possible to maintain zero inflation (the policy
that would be optimal in our model, if the
natural rate were always nonnegative) during
the period in which the natural rate is negative,
as this would require a negative nominal interest
rate. If the central bank is expected to maintain
zero inflation when this is consistent with the
zero bound (and otherwise keep interest rates as
low as possible), the result is severe deflation
and output contraction during the period when
the natural rate is mildly negative, as shown by
the dashed responses in Figure 1. (The figure
plots the responses in the case that the distur-
bance lasts for exactly 15 quarters.)
The responses under the optimal policy com-
mitment are instead shown by the solid lines in
the figure. The nominal interest rate is kept low
for five more quarters after the natural rate of
interest has returned to its normal level; this
causes a small output boom and a mild burst of
inflation, though inflation is soon returned to the
optimal long-run rate of zero. A credible com-
mitment to behave in this way after the zero
bound has ceased to bind dramatically reduces
the price and output declines that occur during
the period when the central bank is constrained
by the zero bound.
In general, of course, the optimal period for
which policy should be committed to remain
loose is not five quarters; it will depend on the
realized path of exogenous disturbances. Thus
the optimal commitment regarding future policy
should be conditional one, as argued by Ben S.
Bernanke and Vincent R. Reinhart (2004). We
show furthermore that the form of conditional
commitment that is optimal can usefully be
expressed as a form of price-level target.
Under the rule that we propose, the central
bank is committed to adjust overnight interest
rates each period so as to hit its output-gap-
adjusted price-level target, if this is consistent
with a nonnegative interest rate; and otherwise
to maintain rates as low as possible. The target
furthermore adjusts over time in response to
past target misses; when the target can be hit, it
does not change, but a period in which it is
consistently undershot causes the target price
level to be permanently raised. Following a
period in which the natural rate has been nega-
tive, this rule requires interest rates to be kept at
zero for a further period, as it is not imme-
diately possible to achieve the target price
level (both because prices have fallen and be-
cause the target has been adjusted upward)—
even though it would be possible, in our model,
for prices to be immediately stabilized at a
lower level.
It is sometimes argued that announcement of
a target for future price increases would be
pointless in a liquidity trap, as the central bank
lacks any instrument with which to hit its target.
We find otherwise. Under our proposal, the
target is not a promise about what price level
will be delivered at any particular date; rather, it
is a commitment regarding the conditions under
which the low-interest-rate policy will be aban-
doned. There is thus no loss of credibility from
failing to hit the target for several quarters in a
row, as long as low interest rates are maintained
as promised. Nor is it pointless to mention the
target when it is not thought likely that it will be
hit in any of the next several months, for aware-
ness of the target allows the private sector to
judge how long policy must remain loose.
Other actions by the central bank, such as
purchases of various assets, may also help; but
they will be effective, in our view, only to the
extent that they help to signal the nature of the
FIGURE 1. RESPONSES TO AN EXOGENOUS DISTURBANCE
THAT LOWERS THE NATURAL RATE OF INTEREST
FROM 4 PERCENT TO 2 PERCENT
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bank’s commitments regarding future policy.
Such signals are more likely to have the desired
effect if they occur in the context of a clear
articulation of the targets that the bank aims to
achieve.
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